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August 20, 2008
The Price of the Criminal-Terror Nexus in Afghanistan
By Douglas Farah
The increasingly sophisticated attacks by the Taliban against U.S. and NATO troops, including the recent coordinated strikes that left 10 French soldiers dead shows how the Taliban has evolved over the past year.
What is clear is that, whatever the strategy there is, it is not working. I would argue that the almost exponential growth rate of opium cultivation in recent years is the vital component in allowing the Taliban to obtain the resources to replenish its fighting capabilities, which were almost destroyed in the wake of 9/11.
This source of income to the Taliban is free from any controls a state sponsor would be able to impose on the use of donated funds. The commodity can be easily exchanged for weapons, or turned into cash to pay for new recruits, training, protection and logistics. A consequence, in addition to the sophisticated frontal attacks, is the rapid growth of increasingly sophisticated road side bombs, now causing the most casualties of any weapon in Afghanistan.
Given that the cash pipeline is not being attacked in any way that is making a significant difference, the plans for a mini surge there, with additional U.S. troops is unlikely to make a key difference.
As US News reported, Some U.S. military officials express skepticism, however, about the impact more U.S. troops can make seven years into the war, in a large country that has grown increasingly violent—with citizens, they add, who are increasingly disillusioned. "I don't know if it's too late," says a senior military official. "But it's going to be much, much harder to turn things around at this point."
In fact, what is alarming in the discussions of the surge in Afghanistan is the almost-total lack of focus on opium revenues as a key component.
If one looks at two recent cases where there has been measurable and important successes against non-state armed groups (Al Qaeda in Iraq and the FARC in Colombia), one of the key components is the shutting off of financial revenues. My full blog is here.
August 19, 2008
Hezbollah Signs Pact with Salafis
By Walid Phares
"But implementation to be decided later"
Amidst a growing world crisis, new developments in Lebanon may signal what lies ahead in the sphere of global jihadist forces in the near future. A memorandum of understanding has been signed by Hezbollah, the main pro-Iranian organization in the region, and a number of Salafist groups outlining efforts to "confront America."
Innocent minds may question how that impacts our lives. However, events that unfold in Beirut have a direct effect on the war on terror, or to be more precise, on the jihadist war on democracies. Here is why:
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The Two Trees
In my last three books (the "Future Jihad Trilogy") I depicted the world web of jihadism as two large trees. The Salafist tree, emanating from radical Sunni circles and encompassing mainly the Wahhabis, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Deobandis is the largest. But it has been evolving and some of its branches have mutated into layers of radicalism. Al-Qaida is one of the latest mutations, for now the most radical.
The Khomeinist tree, centered on the Iranian regime, has a single branch. It is centralized and has disciplined extensions in the region, mostly Hezbollah out of Lebanon.
Each "tree" has a worldview and a future jihad to accomplish. In many realms they oppose each other and they compete for the hearts and minds of Muslims worldwide.
But despite their "brotherly enmity" their respective agendas have two goals in common: one is to oppose the rise of democracy in the region, and the second is to defeat U.S. support for that democracy.
Salafist and Khomeinist jihadis have always claimed they reject each other's doctrines and plans. But despite their ideological bickering they have been able to find common ground -- when it suits them -- and some jihadist Salafis have collaborated with Iran and its Syrian ally, even though most Salafis heavily criticize Khomeinism.
The Lebanon "understanding" between some Salafis and Hezbollah is the first open joint declaration between followers of Tehran's jihadism and the followers of Salafist jihadism. It is a "premiere" with significant consequences.
Road to the Agreement
On Aug. 19, leaders from Hezbollah and Salafist organizations called a press conference at Al Safir Hotel in Beirut's Raouche district and signed a memo of understanding between the two forces.
Radwan Aqeel wrote in the Beirut daily An-Nahar (Aug. 18): "Hezbollah is practicing a calm policy of overture toward the Sunni political and religious forces, especially since last May (against the Sunni Future Movement) to save the image the party has developed in the past as an 'Islamic resistance' in the Arab and Muslim world including in the Arab Gulf, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian territories."
It is believed that the move by Hezbollah to sign an agreement of understanding with Salafist organizations aims ultimately at penetrating the Arab Sunni world via Lebanon's Muslim community and maintaining an influence over the region's attitude toward the West.
According to Aqeel, "this move didn't come [out of the] void, but after many meetings away from media between representatives of Hezbollah and some Salafist groups." These encounters, said An-Nahar, included the head of Hezbollah's political bureau Ibrahim al-Amin and Sheikh Safuan al-Zuhbi from the Salafist movement.
Another Beirut daily, Al-Mustaqbal (Aug. 18) wrote that Hezbollah has been successful in recruiting 15 Salafist groups in Lebanon including the Waqf Ahya' al-Turath al-Islami to form a "Salafist camp" allied to the Iranian-Syrian axis. Hezbollah officials, wrote Al-Mustaqbal, are declaring that Americans have been defeated in the region by "resistance" in Lebanon, Iraq and Gaza.
The founder of the Salafist current in Lebanon, Sheikh Daee al-Islam al-Shahhal said it is "a partial step." Al-Akhbar, the pro-Iranian daily, reported that Shahhal argued, during visits to jihadist movements, that these agreements are happening, because of the "aggression against Islam all over the world."
At first, Shahhal rejected the Hezbollah-Salafist memorandum of understanding. But he revealed that he was not against dialogue (with Hezbollah), "but we have some reservations concerning the attack against the Sunnis in May."
Observers said his declarations were to assure the Saudis that the classical Salafis are not slipping away to the Iranian camp. However the representatives of many other Salafist groups stayed the course firmly. Hassan Shahhal who heads the Belief and Justice Movement (BJM) called the memorandum a step in the right direction.
The agreement commits to:
1) Condemn any Islamic group that assaults another.
2) Abandon incitement, which creates trouble and will allow the "enemies" to take advantage of the situation.
3) "Confront" the American agenda.
4) Firmly support Hezbollah and the Salafist movement against others.
5) Form a religious committee to discuss any disagreements between the Shiites and the Sunnis.
6) Respect each others' opinions.
But under pressures from Salafists who are opposed to HezbollahSheikh Hassan Shahhal, who signed the understanding on Monday with Hizbullah's Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyed, declared freezing the agreement pending "appropriate circumstances that allow its implementation." In other words, the document was produced and signed, which was the most difficult stage. The second stage, implementation, will depend on the ability of Hezbollah to recruit more Salafists via financial incentives and political backing.
Consequences of the Agreement
Undoubtedly, the consequences of this event will be filled with strategic implications. Certainly this joint declaration is only between a number of Salafist groups, not the entire tree, let alone the Wahhabi Muslim Brotherhood web on one hand and Hezbollah; it remains confined to Lebanon; we're not dealing with an all-out two-trees jihadist merge.
Far from that, what we're witnessing is a massive move on behalf of one tree, the Khomeinists, to connect to some branches of the Salafist tree.
These attempts aren't new, for Iran has been funding "Sunni" Hamas and Islamic Jihad for decades. And the Syrian regime has been controlling Sunni-Salafist satellites for years.
Fatah al-Islam, a Salafist combat group which fought the Lebanese army during the summer of 2007 has been released from Syria into northern Lebanon. But all of these relationships were not declared openly nor were they organized officially.
The Salafist-Hezbollah agreement in Lebanon is a novelty from which there are a number of lessons to be learnt:
1) It demonstrates that Hezbollah continues to move forward after its big win in May against Lebanon's first Fouad Siniora government and the March 14 Coalition.
The organization relentlessly controls the national security decision making process of Lebanon and is stretching its military presence in areas it had never reached before, such as into the heart of the Christian areas north of Beirut; and soon, the Sunni north.
The agreement will serve as a launching pad to begin establishing a presence through these Salafis from the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli, all the way to the northern border with Syria. In short, and as Salafist leaders opposed to the agreement have stated, this is a strategic penetration of the Sunni community in Lebanon via its most militant segment, the Islamist Salafis.
2) Regionally, a Hezbollah-Salafist coordination space will receive highly-strategic aid from Iran's oil power and will profit from Syria's intelligence apparatus.
While since 2003 the Syrian-Iranian axis was extending a discrete support to the jihadist-Salafis, escorting them to the Sunni Triangle in Iraq to fight the U.S.-led coalition, as of the birth of this new consortium in Beirut, Hezbollah and its regional backers have no reason to be shy.
In fact as is the case with Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the "Palestinian arms" of Tehran-Damascus, we may see the rise of a "Salafist arm" of that axis with all the unnatural ideological ingredients this could display. If the Shiite Khomeinists were able to accommodate Alawi socialists why not extend this market to Salafist forces? But the implications could be earth-shattering for the rest of the region.
Writing in Kuwait's Al-Siyassa (Aug. 18), Hamid Ghoriafi reported that "Iranian Pasdaran and Hezbollah have already started bringing Salafist groups to Lebanon from other countries to be trained and then sending them to Arab Gulf countries to deploy them for the greater battle to come against the United States and its allies."
This is a classical Iranian tactic: using a proxy force to terrorize their foes into submission. Saudis, Kuwaitis, Egyptians, Jordanians and beyond are on notice: There is now a Salafist force in a joint venture with Iranian backed Hezbollah.
3) Internationally, this will have a ripple effect far beyond Lebanon's borders. Pictures of Salafist and Hezbollah leaders embracing and committing to a unified Islamist jihad against the enemies of the "umma," or Muslim world, can send waves of emotional charges around the Arab world.
The mere image of branches from the two trees joining forces against the enemy will have a chilling effect on the jihadist movement.
The international community will be facing two networks, but three creatures: al-Qaida and its worldwide Salafist constellation on the one hand, and the Tehran-led nebulous with Syrian-Iranian intelligence services in the center, Hezbollah in the front and a web of small Salafis on Iran's payroll instead of the Wahhabis -- all-in-all pretty complicated for Western intelligence services to penetrate.
Failed Debate in West
Indeed, the major lesson from this small experiment of a marriage between a Khomeinist organization and a Salafist network -- even if it won't attract all Salafis, is that Western analysis has failed, one more time.
With some solid exceptions, the bulk of North American and European academic and expert literature has erred in the mass assertion that what we saw in Beirut was not to happen, cannot happen and will not happen. Pre- and post Sept. 11, 2001 research, which has seriously influenced governments on both sides of the Atlantic has been overconfident that since the Sunni-Shia religious divide cannot be bridged, these two spheres cannot converge.
Many scholars of Middle Eastern studies established in the United States and the West have argued for years against the possibility of a joint venture between the two branches of Islamism.
They even rejected the "limited possibility" of such a coordination between Salafis and Khomeinists. Hence their advice to decision-making institutions and to media has negatively affecting long-term national security strategic planning.
The essence of the analytical errors made by scholarly advisers to the war on terror can be encapsulated in two points:
First, the overwhelming majority of Middle Eastern studies apologist attitudes was to wrongly assert that traditional Salafism in its essence is neither political nor militant: 'just conservatives practicing spiritual revivalism,' they said.
But ironically those Salafis who joined Hezbollah in a strategic venture in Beirut were among the circles presented by the apologists as the "good Salafis," versus the "bad Salafis" of al-Qaida.
Second, that same dominant elite in academia kept theorizing that Salafis by nature cannot sit at the same table with Khomeinists.
Well some have just done so, and the "model" is here. Now, as these events are countering the most critical expert advice provided to Washington and Brussels, the next stage for the alternative counter-terrorism expertise is to help decision-makers realize how dramatic this Beirut experiment could become.
Even with a 10 percent chance of success the consequences of the so-called war on terror from the Middle East to Africa, Europe and the Americas are endless.
More important could be the effects of any model of Salafist-Khomeinist collaboration on U.S. Homeland Security. This particular chapter will be addressed later, but it is useful and astounding to observe how the jihadis are experimenting and evolving while recent efforts in America and Europe have led to the creation of a lexicon which, if anything, would blind the counter-terrorism communities and decision-makers from "seeing" these and other new dangers.
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Walid Phares is the director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy. He is the author of The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad « Close It
Ideological Blinders and Missed Opportunities in Counter-Radicalization
By Matthew Levitt
Jeffrey Imm’s recent broadside against myself, my colleague Michael Jacobson, The Washington Institute’s Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, West Point’s Counterterrorism Center, and the Quilliam Foundation is a poor reflection of the Counterterrorism Blog in its departure from the Blog’s tradition of civil and scholarly debate. Unfortunately, Imm’s blog is neither.
Contrary to Mr. Imm’s assertion that I criticized him in my July 17 post, that article barely mentioned him at all (and never in a derogatory tone) focusing instead on the substance at hand. In concluded, “While Mr. Imm is right that not every extremist or terrorist renouncing their former way of life is fully deradicalized, to dismiss all of them is not only short sighted, but risks missing valuable opportunities for the US and its allies.” Mr. Imm’s most recent post only underlines that conclusion.
But before I address the substantive issues, let me correct just two of Mr. Imm’s multiple factual errors.
In his post, Mr. Imm criticizes my colleague Michael Jacobson for citing Dr. Fadl as someone who has renounced terrorism in a recent article published in West Point CTC's publication "The Sentinel." Mr. Imm says that this is part of a broader pattern with the Washington Institute, accusing us of having a "consistently uncritical view" regarding those who claim to have left terrorism behind.
Mr. Imm's charges on this issue are badly off the mark. First, Mr. Imm has taken Mr. Jacobson's statements out of context to suggest that he has given Dr. Fadl the seal of approval. In his article, Mr. Jacobson was not citing Dr. Fadl's renunciation to indicate that he was persuaded that it was genuine. In fact, Mr. Jacobson was making a far different point -- that despite the positive attention heaped on Dr. Fadl and others who have publicly recanted, we do not know what the effect of these recantations will be on those currently in terrorist organizations. We need to understand this issue far better to design a successful and effective counterterrorism program. To take this very legitimate point and use it to "demonstrate" that the Institute is uncritical is quite disingenuous.
Mr. Imm's ideologically driven analysis is clear from the fact that he so readily dismisses the possible broader implications of Dr. Fadl's statements. Even if Dr. Fadl hasn't fully renounced all terrorism, it would still be very significant that one of the original founders of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, a man on whom Bin Ladin and al Qaeda have relied to provide the ideological foundation for their takfiri ideology, is now recanting some of his former positions. Many analysts believe that his statements criticizing al Qaeda - along with those of other former clerics and terrorist leaders - are beginning to cause a real schism within the global jihadist community. How the US can take advantage of a possible fissure through its counterterrorism and counter-radicalization efforts is a critical and immediate question that Mr. Imm is far too quick to dismiss. While there is certainly room for skepticism about the ultimate ramifications, it is critical to at least consider the potential implications of these recent developments.
Mr. Imm took the liberty of quoting me out of context as well. Imm contends that I made “the incredible claim” that the way back from Islamism is through political salafists who have credibility when it comes to deradicalizing others. In fact, I noted that officials in the UK, the Netherlands and elsewhere have successfully leveraged even political salafists in their counter-radicalization efforts, even as they see these groups for what they are and recognize they still support some forms of extremism. Without accepting them, these governments are using them to their advantage. I noted this, concluding that “these are issues which bear further exploring”:
Another important question that needs to be asked, and one that has often been given short- shrift (including on this blog) is how to leverage the ideological fissures that develop between and among our adversaries -- even when the more moderate wing is still not as moderate as we would like them to be. In the UK, for example, a distinction is often made between "jihadi salafists" and "political salafists," with the government willing to work with some groups that fall into the latter category but none in the former. (For the record, Quilliam has come out against working with groups that fall into either category). Not only do the political salafists have credibility when it comes to deradicalizing others, but as the Dutch argue it may be better to keep them in the larger tent than drive them further underground. In addition, having recently spent time in the UK (as well as France and Holland), talking to counterterrorism officials and local community leaders, it is striking how concerned they are about the threat of an imminent attack. Against that background, it becomes more understandable why they're trying to find allies wherever they can. The British realize they may have significant differences with "political salafists" who think "resistance" in Palestine or Iraq is legitimate, but are thinking about ways that they can at least leverage them and their positions in an effort to de-radicalize the most severe extremists (taqfiris) randomly targeting civilians today.
Mr. Imm also ignored in his postings inconvenient truths. For example, Mr. Imm challenged Quilliam to reject Islamic supremacism, and when Mr. Nawaz did exactly that it went unacknowledged by Mr. Imm.
On the issue of substance, Mr. Imm confuses and conflates two separate issues. The question is not whether radical Islamic extremism is a problem, nor whether support for terrorism or political violence is acceptable in some circumstances but not in others - we’re all in agreement that suicide bombing in Israel or Iraq is just as barbaric, criminal and unacceptable as use of that tactic is in the UK or elsewhere. A review of the Institute’s Stein Program’s work on the subject speaks for itself, and is there for the general public and Mr. Imm to review, including our books, peer-reviewed academic articles, policy articles, editorials, and more.
Rather, the issue is how to leverage “political salafists” in our counter-radicalization campaigns when, unlike Quilliam, they are not fully moderate and do still support some forms of “jihad” or terrorism that we do not. We need not accept them to use them to our advantage, a cornerstone of traditional tradecraft.
Mr. Imm is correct to question how it is that analysts should go about assessing claims of moderation by Muslim groups, especially by former radicals. The answer, I submit once more, is that it requires something more than armchair analysis and research-by-Google. Mr. Imm notes that as a second generation British-American he has spent plenty of time in the UK. But time spent visiting cousins is not field research. How much of that time has Mr. Imm spent interviewing former Jihadists? How much of that time was spent in East or North London? How much time did Mr. Imm invest meeting with intelligence, law enforcement, or the Home Office? These types of meetings are key to understanding not only the terrorist threat, but what should be done to counter it. While Mr. Imm’s open source research is thorough, true scholarship must also include reviewing primary sources and conducting on the ground, first-hand field research. Mr. Imm may disagree with us based on articles he’s read online, but Mr. Jacobson and I feel reaching out to groups like Quilliam, and exploring ways to leverage fissures within the extremist community, are critical aspects of a successful counterterrorism strategy.
August 18, 2008
Quilliam Foundation and Misdirection on Egypt's Grand Mufti Ali Gomaa
By Jeffrey Imm
In my July 16, 2008 article "False Reports of Jihadists 'Quitting' or Abandoning Islamic Supremacism," I challenged the Quilliam Foundation to address some key questions that were being asked about its organization. The primary issue I raised was its documented support for Egyptian Grand Mufti Sheik Ali Gomaa (also spelled "Ali Gum'a" or "Goma").
In reply, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Director Matthew Levitt criticized me on July 17 for asking this obvious question, and on August 15, that same organization's Michael Jacobson published a "response" to my July 16 article on behalf of Maajid Nawaz of the Quilliam Foundation.
Mr. Nawaz's comments in Mr. Jacobson's reposting "Quilliam Responds" are not a response at all, but are directed towards a July 30, 2008 letter from various senators to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice regarding "a 2003 article in Egypt's 'Al-Haqiqa' newspaper quoting Ali Goma defending terrorist acts in Israel." Mr. Nawaz dismisses this quote as he states it is coming from a "Wahabite-Islamist source" and "a newspaper that explicitly promotes a Shari'ah-law based Caliphate." (On the other hand, Mr. Nawaz does not explain how he defends Ali Gomaa who is interviewed in the March 2008 U.S. News and World Report as seeing Sharia as a solution for "Islamic extremism.")
Mr. Nawaz further defends Gomaa by referencing a July 21, 2007 Newsweek / Washington Post blog article where Gomaa seeks to define jihad with "a large category of meanings," and where Gomaa states that "Islam forbids suicide" and "Islam forbids aggression against others." (This did not stop Gomaa from defending the terrorist group Hezbollah, as he viewed Hezbollah attacks on Israel as a "defense of its country and not terrorism" and called for support for Hezbollah as a "religious duty.") On July 24, 2007, the Gulf News reported an update on Gomaa's comments to Newsweek / Washington Post regarding "apostasy," quoting Gomaa: "What I actually said is that Islam prohibits a Muslim from changing his religion and that apostasy is a crime, which must be punished."
Mr. Nawaz further dismisses criticism of Gomaa by using a ploy of playing on assumed political divisions: "[o]n the matter of support for Ali Goma, it seems rather ironic that right-wing critics share their worries over our stance, probably to their horror, with Marxists on the far-left such as the UK Guardian's Seamus Milne." Unfortunately those who think that criticism of Islamic supremacism is merely a right-left issue, fail to understand the issue and certainly fail to understand America's history in fighting supremacist ideologies. Mr. Nawaz should recognize that his experiences with the Nazi Combat 18 group were part of a continuing challenge against supremacist ideologies, and that the battle against supremacism beliefs will not be addressed by inconsistencies or by pandering to inaccurate assumptions about right-left political divisions.
The larger issue that my July 16 article raised is how can an organization that attacks political Islamism, such as Quilliam Foundation, support an individual as Egyptian Grand Mufti Sheik Ali Gomaa, which it calls a "Muslim scholastic giant," when there are numerous articles about Gomaa that would make him a questionable "scholar" to emulate?
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The simple answer is that in their efforts against political Islamism, Quilliam is seeking "scholars" that will justify their goal to develop a "Western Islam" as a method to counter political Islamism. Quilliam apparently believes that there are limited "scholars" that would provide such justification, and therefore the ends justifies the means (even though such an approach will not work in an ideological battle).
So the Quilliam Foundation chose Mufti Sheik Ali Gomaa as an example of "Muslim scholastic giants" to provide guidance to Muslims in adapting "to local cultures and traditions, while remaining true to the essence of their faith..." despite the numerous negative media reports readily available about Ali Gomaa. While Mr. Nawaz continues to defend Quilliam's support for Gomaa by stating that "Mufti Ali Goma must stand innocent until proven guilty," perhaps he can explain how Americans should be supporting a group who admires and defends someone like Mufti Sheik Ali Gomaa -- who supports the terrorist group Hezbollah, thinks that Sharia law is the answer to "extremism," views that "social violence is the result of the secularists' attempt to impose their principles upon society," is quoted as calling Israeli Jews "blood-suckers," is quoted as calling for the denial of freedom of religion, calls for the death penalty for adultery, and takes a relativistic view towards wife-beating. (This includes media reports from such "right-wing critics" as the Associated Press, the New York Times, and U.S. News and World Report, as well as Egypt's Al-Ahram that is frequently quoted by left-wing Counterpunch.)
If Mr. Nawaz continues to defend Mufti Sheik Ali Gomaa as a role model for the Quilliam Foundation's objective in developing a "Western Islam," then it is fair for analysts to question what that vision of "Western Islam" really is. That is truly the challenge to the Quilliam Foundation. Moreover, it is not the responsibility of the general public to prove the worthiness or unworthiness of Quilliam's esteemed "Muslim scholastic giants," but it is the responsibility of the Quilliam Foundation to thoroughly vet individuals that they claim represent their guidance and message to Muslims. "Innocent until proven guilty" is not a coherent approach for promoting role models.
More troubling is the consistently uncritical view of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence regarding groups or individuals that claim to be against "extremism." Michael Jacobson accepts that Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (also known as Dr. Fadl) has renounced terrorism, when al-Sharif clearly supports Jihad in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Israel, and states that "Jihad in Afghanistan will lead to the creation of an Islamic state with the triumph of the Taliban, God willing." Mr. Jacobson's article was published in the increasingly disturbing West Point Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) Sentinel -- a month after the Sentinel published George Mason University's Peter Mandaville call for engagement with Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood as a counterterrorism strategy. The Stein Program's Director Matthew Levitt makes the incredible claim that the "Way Back from Islamism" is through "political salafists [who] have credibility when it comes to deradicalizing others." Neither Mr. Levitt nor Mr. Jacobson makes any critical comments about Egyptian Grand Mufti Sheik Ali Gomaa while uncritically praising the Quilliam Foundation. Moreover, the Stein Program's Matthew Levitt dismisses any such criticism by claims that "spending time in the communities" of the United Kingdom and the Europe is mandatory to being able to assess "the threat on the ground."
As a second-generation British American myself, I can assure the Stein Program's staff that I have spent plenty of time in the United Kingdom. Yet I recognize that the continuing threats from the United Kingdom to America's homeland security will not be resolved by looking the other way regarding inconsistencies in potential allies as a tactical short-term measure. It is not the micro analysis of individual "communities" that drives a war strategy, but a macro analysis of the enemy and its ideology. Facing such an ideological threat requires strategic honesty, criticality, consistency, and most of all a definition of the enemy and its ideology.
Where American governmental leadership and analysts in counterterrorism have failed is in the definition of the enemy and its ideology which allows such inconsistencies of tactical measures. When the enemy is "extremism," anyone can be an ally, because "extremism" can mean anything to anyone.
Moreover, the political science definition of "Islamism" has also clearly failed as well. I will recognize this as a personal failure as well, because I failed to imagine in my repeated statements of Islamism as a totalitarian and anti-freedom ideology, how others could claim to be against Islamism while seeing political salafism as an antidote or could claim to be against Islamism while supporting individuals who see Sharia as an answer to "extremism." Moreover, I failed to imagine that West Point would publish articles calling for embracing Islamism as a positive political force to fight terrorism. Unquestionably, this shows that the term "Islamism," while intended to refer to an Islamic supremacist political ideology, is too inexact a term to be used in further strategic discussion. Peter Mandaville, the Stein Program, and the Quilliam Foundation (among many others) have categorically proven this over the past several months.
As I discuss in my July 2, 2008 article "Crossroads in History: The Struggle against Jihad and Supremacist Ideologies," clearly our American historical experience against supremacism provides us with the direction to address the current enemy. But as we continue to struggle in the war of ideas, we must reframe the debate from "extremists" to "Jihadists", and from "Islamism" to "Islamic supremacism." Until we strategically address the supremacist nature of the enemy, the tactics and allies that we choose will not serve our cause over the long war.
Sources and Related Documents:
August 15, 2008 - Quilliam Responds -- Counterterrorism Blog - by Michael Jacobson (posted for Quilliam Foundation's Maajid Nawaz)
July 21, 2007 - Newsweek/Washington Post: Ali Gomaa: The Meaning of Jihad in Islam
Quilliam Foundation - About Us
July 17, 2008 - The Way Back from Islamism -- Counterterrorism Blog - by Matthew Levitt
July 16, 2008 - False Reports of Jihadists "Quitting" or Abandoning Islamic Supremacism -- Counterterrorism Blog - by Jeffrey Imm
West Point Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel, July 2008 - Why Terrorists Quit: Gaining from Al-Qa'ida's Losses -- by Michael Jacobson
July 16, 2008 - Washington Institute for Near East Policy: The Way Back from Islamism - Featuring Maajid Nawaz
Washington Institute for Near East Policy - Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence
-- Experts
March 6, 2008 - U.S. News and World Report: Egypt's Grand Mufti Counters the Tide of Islamic Extremism -- by Jay Tolson
August 4, 2006 - New York Times: Hostilities in the Mideast: the Muslim world; Hezbollah's Prominence Has Many Arabs Worried
July 30, 2006 - AP: Hezbollah's resistance winning Arab support
April 3, 2006 - AFP: Fatwa against statues triggers uproar in Egypt
-- Egypt's Grand Mufti Ali Gomaa fatwa against statues
October 31, 2007 - MEMRI: In Interview, Egyptian Mufti Ali Gum'a Questioned On Treatment of Women in Islam, Blames 'Secularists' For Terrorism Worldwide
September 13, 2007 - MEMRI Video: Mufti of Egypt Ali Gum'a Confronted with Questions about the Treatment of Women in Islam and Blames "Secularists" for Terrorism Worldwide
-- Transcript
July 24, 2007 - Gulf News: Top cleric denies 'freedom to choose religion' comment
-- "What I actually said is that Islam prohibits a Muslim from changing his religion and that apostasy is a crime, which must be punished," Goma'a said
April 13, 2007 - MEMRI: As Part of Its Struggle Against the Muslim Brotherhood
August 18, 2006 - MEMRI: The Mufti of Egypt: The True Face of the Blood-Sucking Hebrew Entity has Been Exposed
May 26, 2006 - MEMRI: Mufti of Egypt Sheik Ali Gum'a: Wife-Beating Is Permitted by Islam in Muslim Countries, but Is Forbidden in the West
Egypt's Al-Ahram Weekly Online
Al-Ahram Frequent Quotations on Left-Wing Web-Sites
July 2, 2008 - Crossroads in History: The Struggle against Jihad and Supremacist Ideologies -- Counterterrorism Blog - by Jeffrey Imm
« Close It
Al Qaeda in Lebanon
By Olivier Guitta
Part of the three-part piece that I am writing for the Middle East Times on Al Qaeda's opportunistic strategy, I explored today Al Qaeda's alleged presence in Lebanon.
In case you missed the first part, you can read it here. You can read part 2 Al Qaeda in Gaza here.
Today's full article is here.
Here is an excerpt:
While Lebanese President Gen. Michel Suleiman was visiting Syrian President Bashar Assad, a terror attack hit Tripoli, Lebanon's second-largest city, killing 18 people, including nine soldiers and injuring over 40. It is still unclear who was behind this bloody attack, but fingers are pointing at Fatah al-Islam, the al-Qaida linked group that fought the Lebanese army in 2007 in the Palestinian camp of Nahr al-Bared. In fact Fatah al-Islam's leader, Shaker al-Absi, recently said he would target the military. But more than anything, it is the growing presence of al-Qaida in Lebanon that is worrying.
As early as 2006, Ahmed Fatfat, then Lebanese interior minister, revealed details about al-Qaida's presence in Lebanon.
Fatfat noted: "For the past 45 months, al-Qaeda has been trying to settle in Lebanon. The organization infiltrates combatants and recruits on the ground. We recently dismantled two groups suspected of belonging to this network. One month ago we stopped 13 individuals coming from various countries of the Middle East, who were preparing attacks inside the country. We also have just stopped five people implied in attacks against military positions."
Al Qaeda At 20: Some Thoughts
By Douglas Farah
I think Peter Bergen's Outlook section piece in the Washington Post was very useful in looking at al Qaeda at 20. It is hard to believe they have been around that long.
Of particular to me is his discussion of the deep differences between Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman on the future of al Qaeda. After two decades the nature of the enemy, and how different parts relate to each other, are still in dispute.
Bergen got it right in explaining why the two views, although often presented as such, are not mutually exclusive. As with so much of how we view the new world and its complex and shifting networks and alliances, many in the policy community and intelligence communities want things to be one way or the other. Usually they are not.
This is true in large part because the enemy is constantly moving, realigning and reconfiguring, both in response to the internal dynamics within the groups, and to external pressures. Their Darwinian ability to adapt to survive, and the elimination of their weakest and least careful members, make the task of tracing them ever harder.
The groups will also undergo tests of trial and error (the biggest error, as Bergen points out, being al Qaeda in Iraq's impressive loss of support among the Sunni population because of its increasingly brutal tactics) that will lead to shifting behavior and thinking over time.
While al Qaeda Central, as Bergen and others call the old guard, no longer can exercise the direct command and control that had before, the demise of Al Qaeda in Iraq is largely a boon for bin Laden.
He now has foreign fighters flocking to areas where he exercises the most direct control, again making the core al Qaeda a vital reference point-personally, ideologically and theologically-to those movements.
This is ironic, as al Qaeda in a general sense has lost a great deal of sympathy around the world, as has the Taliban. State sponsorship, such as the Taliban received from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan prior to 9/11, is now considerably less and considerably more muted.
This lack of state sponsorship is one of the driving forces behind the growing ties of these groups to criminal activity. Only resources on the scale gleaned from drug trafficking can fund a significant army for any length of time. This is one of the reasons I feel so strongly that the alliance is both inevitable and incredibly dangerous. My full blog is here.
August 17, 2008
Hezbollah’s telecommunications expansion
By Walid Phares
As part of his ongoing monitoring and analyzing of the strategic expansion of Hezbollah in Lebanon, military expert Thomas Smith published a series of articles and blogs following up on the build up by the Iranian-backed militia in Lebanon, particularly in the areas north of the Litani river. In his last piece he had a conversation assessment with me on the latest penetration by Hezbollah of the Mount Lebanon areas, north of the Druze districts into the heartland of the Christian areas. It follows another piece about Hezbollah's strenght. Please find the two short blogs here.
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BEYOND THE DROPZONE - World Defense Review
Phares on Hezbollah’s telecommunications expansion
by W. Thomas Smith Jr. on 17 August 2008
In a conversation last week with Middle East terrorism expert Dr. Walid Phares regarding Hezbollah’s recent strategic positioning and repositioning since the 2006 war with Israel - more specifically since the attacks on the Lebanese government in May 2008 - the subject came up of Hezbollah’s extensive telecommunications system.
I was reporting the existence of Hezbollah’s telecommunications system - and Hezbollah’s control of much of greater Lebanon’s telecom system - as early as September of 2007 (when I was in Lebanon). Dr. Phares has also been writing about it, and with much greater specificity than perhaps any other writer or analyst to date.
On Wednesday, Phares told me:
“Before the invasion of West Beirut and the assault on the Druze mountain, Hezbollah’s telecommunications systems were up-and-running and fully operational in half of Lebanon. They showed the structure of absorption for thousands of Hezbollah fighters and Iranian Pasdaran already deployed in Lebanon. The swift takeover of half of Lebanon’s capital and the multi-axis advance on the Shuf heights demonstrated that this system can insure an internal “hard” communications which can instruct, direct, guide, and move large units from one side of Lebanon to another.
“Following the political victory of Hezbollah in Doha and the surrender of the Lebanese first cabinet of Seniora and the March 14 Coalition to the Syrian-Iranian agenda, Hezbollah’s TC system not only survived, but we believe was extended and expanded. Reports - including those from media open sources - tells us that the TC system was stretched across the line of summits from the Metn area in the center northbound to Kesruwan and Jbeil mountains, deep in the Christian heartland of Lebanon. Hezbollah operatives and special forces have been seen on the commanding heights and summits of central Mount Lebanon where they’ve established “security zones.” The Iranian-backed militia today controls better strategic location than that which was ever controlled by the Syrian occupation forces before 2005.”
Hezbollah "five-times" stronger than it was during Israeli war
In terms of weaponry, strategic and political positioning, and its ever-expanding international reach; Hezbollah is "five times more capable today," than it was at the beginning of the July 2006 war with Israel: A fact, according to experts, that prompted Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak to tell his troops during a Tuesday morning tour of positions along the Golan Heights, "It's not for nothing that we're training here."
Not for nothing indeed. Poised just over the border in south Lebanon is Hezbollah; a Lebanon-based Shiia terrorist army, organized somewhat on the Taliban model, heavily funded and equipped by Iran and operationally supported by both Iran and Syria.
Hezbollah has strengthened its strategic positions across Lebanon in recent months. And in recent weeks, its military training and posturing has increased in regions of the country far beyond its traditionally recognized southern defenses (below the Litani River) and Al Dahiyeh (Hezbollah's south Beirut stronghold near the airport).
Worse, Hezbollah's newfound political power - literally forced on the government at the point of a gun after Hezbollah turned its weapons on the Lebanese citizenry in May 2008 - has enabled the terrorist group to both maintain its private militia status (including its possession of military grade weapons and a massive private telecommunications system) and position itself as a "legitimate" arm of the Lebanese Defense apparatus. And the West - including the virtually impotent United Nations forces in Lebanon - has done absolutely nothing to prevent any of it.
All of this - accomplished despite the will of the pro-democracy majority in Lebanon - has emboldened Hezbollah, and created an environment wherein the terrorist group now feels comfortable openly-flexing its muscle in areas of Lebanon that suggest ominous plans for that country's future.
Since the attacks in May, eye-witnesses and open-sources from Arab-language newspapers have reported an increasing number of Hezbollah paramilitary exercises - scouting, navigating, night operations - many of those exercises being conducted provocatively close to Christian areas of Lebanon, and along-or-near strategically vital roads that pass through the mountains between the coast and the Bekaa Valley to the Syrian border.
For instance, in the months before and weeks since the May attacks, Hezbollah and Pasdaran (Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) fighters - according to more than one independent source - have conducted small military exercises in the area around the town of Jezzine, east of Sidon.
"Reports about this have been limited because journalists either don't fully recognize the strategic significance or they are afraid of Hezbollah," says Col. Charbel Barakat (Lebanese Army, ret.), a former infantry brigade commander who today directs the office of counterterrorism for the pro-democracy World Council of the Cedars Revolution. "Almost no Western journalists have reported this, and only a few Lebanese have."
Further north in the Sannine mountains west of Zahle, Hezbollah has reportedly set up guided-missile batteries and early-warning radar. Civilian hikers unfortunate enough to venture into this area reportedly have been detained, held, and interrogated for several hours by Hezbollah militiamen.
Also in recent weeks, Hezbollah and Pasdaran reportedly have been observed training and setting up temporary outposts in the Aqura area on the road between Aqura and Baalbeck - and the security teams surrounding the exercise zone in one instance were reportedly wearing Lebanon Internal Security Forces (ISF) uniforms, though the ISF according to our sources denied they had policemen in the area at that time.
Aqura is key, because it is along the east-to-west road from Aqura to the coast that in a future war, Hezbollah plans to cut the country's largest Christian area in half. In such an attack - similar to what Hezbollah has previously done in Druze areas of the western Bekaa - Hezbollah fighters would knife through the Christian area, accessing pre-staged weapons and ammunition from the Shiia villages of Lasa, Almat, Ras Osta, and Kafr Salah which are located along (or fairly close to) the Aqura-to-Jbail trek.
"Hezbollah is establishing layered-defenses north of the Litani, in the southern and central Bekaa, and they have reinforced their presence in southern Beirut." says Dr. Walid Phares, director of the Future of Terrorism Project for the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. "They also have created new positions in Mount Lebanon and in the far north near the highest peak of the Cedars mountains. Which means technically, Hezbollah - which means Iran - controls the highest ground in the region south of Turkey."
Strategic positioning is behind Hezbollah's activity: Controlling as much of the commanding high-ground as possible and being positioned to cut roads and divide-and-isolate Sunni, Druze, and Christian areas in the event of war.
"Hezbollah knows that he who controls the mountains - consequently the mountain passes - controls all of Lebanon," says Barakat. "Hezbollah is also telling itself, 'I am afraid the Israelis will attack me north of the Litani (so I will strengthen those positions above the Litani) and I am not allowed to have my weapons and missiles south of the Litani, so I will move them north.'"
Like the Israelis, Hezbollah is not simply training for "nothing." Unlike the Israelis - who train solely to defend their state - the ultimate goals of Hezbollah are to control as much of Lebanon as possible, further the aims of the Iranian Revolution, and generally export terror.
What makes Hezbollah particularly scary today is the organization's increasing political clout, the attempt in some circles to whitewash who-and-what they are, and as Phares says, "Hezbollah today is five-times more capable militarily than it was during the July 2006 war."
— W. Thomas Smith Jr
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NEFA Foundation: Focus on the Taliban's Official Al-Somood Magazine
By Evan Kohlmann
In reflection of the growing intensity of Taliban activity in Pakistan and Afghanistan, over the coming weeks, the NEFA Foundation will be releasing a stream of content drawn from Al-Somood, a monthly Islamic magazine published by the Taliban’s media center. Al-Somood began publication in the summer of 2006, and features a variety of content--including updates on military maneuvers, interviews with senior Taliban leadership figures, and ideological messages calling for the implementation of "martyrdom operations."
In the first translated excerpt now available on the NEFA Foundation website (dated July 2007), Al-Somood interviews Mullah Akhthar Muhammad Mansur, the Taliban’s Military Commander in the Kandahar District. Asked about the number of fighters under his leadership, Mansur said, "In practice, there are 3,500 mujahideen in Kandahar who are fighting the crusaders. However, the number of the mujahideen is much greater than this, but we have armed a limited number among us with weapons and supplies. In the times of necessity this number will be raised easily, because all of the men and the youth in the county carry the spirit of jihad and of sacrifice against the enemy.”
NEFA Foundation: Video of Haji Namdar Interview
By Evan Kohlmann
 The NEFA Foundation has released excerpts of an exclusive interview with Haji Namdar, who was shot to death at a mosque in Khyber Agency on August 13, 2008; (the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan later took credit for the attack). Among the most well-known radical ‘leaders’ in Khyber, Namdar served as head of the now-defunct militant organization "Amr Bilmaroof Wa Nahi Anilmunkar" ("The Movement for Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil"). He also joined forces with Mangal Bagh, supporting him in the recent clashes against government forces. On June 30, 2008, Namdar’s house was destroyed during the recent military offensive ordered by Islamabad. NEFA interviewed Haji Namadar at an undisclosed location in the Bar Qambarkhel area, Khyber Agency on May 2, 2008, one day after he was unsuccessfully targeted by a Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) suicide bomber.
The video can be viewed on the NEFA Foundation website.
August 15, 2008
The Dangers of Foregoing Long-Term Assessments
By Douglas Farah
I was taken by the Washington Post's Anne Applebaum's recent column on the lack of attention that led to the current situation in Georgia.
She points out, rightly, that:
The time to deal with this conflict is not now but was two, or even four, years ago. For a very long time it has been clear that there was a security vacuum in the Caucasus; that this vacuum was dangerous; that war was likely; that Georgia, an eager ally of the United States, would not emerge well from a confrontation; and that a successful invasion of Georgia, a country with U.S. troops on its soil, would reflect badly on the West.
Cowardice, weakness, lack of ideas and, above all, the distraction of other events prevented any deeper engagement. And now it may be too late.
The truth is there is virtually no effort to develop an understanding not just of the world as it is-and the Caucasus, like much of the rest of the world, is not really known in policy and intelligence circles now-but what it may look like in a decade or two.
This has to do with many issues, including the criminal structures, their overlap with terrorist group, the reach these groups have into governments and weapons supplies, what supplies remain available, and what is the present and likely future presence of radical Islam and other violent non-state actors.
There are multiple states that now operate as criminal enterprises (and Russia seems well on its way to joining their ranks) that offer the key havens for the growing criminal-terrorist nexus. For a broader look at these issues, see this paper I did for the NEFA Foundation.
These are different advantages from those offered by truly failed states or regions. Criminal states provide weapons, end-user certificates, travel documents, aircraft registries, banking facilities and much more to groups-including radical Islamist groups-who can buy or talk their way into the game in these havens. My full blog is here.
No Attack in the US Since 9-11?
By Madeleine Gruen & Frank Hyland
This is the fourth article in the series by Madeleine Gruen and Frank Hyland on the threat of terrorism in the United States. In this article we lay out the history of plots and attacks that have taken place in the US since 9-11 in order to respond to the widespread misconception that there have been no terrorist attacks on US soil since that date.
Readers have heard the question “why have there been no terrorist attacks in the US since 9-11-2001” bandied between counter-terrorism professionals on countless occasions. These debates are premised on the false presumption that there have not been any attacks. In fact, there have been a number of attacks and there have been additional plots that did not come to fruition, due to excellent counter-terrorism efforts in some cases and due to the sheer incompetence of the conspirators in other cases. The latter condition does not disparage an incredibly hard-working, bright and dedicated CT Community. However, just as British authorities have learned in the years since 9/11, effort and competence levels evolve and it is important to recognize the patterns before conditions ripen to a point where actors are able to carry out a plot successfully, as was the case on July 7, 2005.
The Al-Qa’ida leadership has told us repeatedly that it intends to attack the United States again. As observers have learned, Al-Qa’ida has a good track record of following through with their threats. Recent history has also shown that when their efforts fail initially they have continued trying until they achieved a “successful” attack. Although somewhat more veiled, and what we might call less “successful,” racist separatist groups have also made near-constant threats. Some have followed through. In this article, we reference plots and attacks that are directly tied to the aforementioned groups, and we also present to you attacks and plots executed by individuals who were inspired by the ideology of recognized terrorist groups.
We acknowledge that one aspect or another of every example we provide to you here may be debated. You may say, “the actor’s motivations may be unclear and therefore difficult to label as terrorism,” or the situation was “all talk.” We are, however, including the following examples because we believe that they are indicative of a pattern and of the aspirations inspired by a particular brand of ideology.
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By now, almost everyone has suffered through the additional security procedures at US airports. Every time you are forced to remove your shoes you can thank Richard Colvin Reid (AKA Abdul Rahim) of the UK. Reid was a passenger aboard American Airlines Flight 63 - Paris to Miami - on 22 December 2001, just weeks after 9-11, when he attempted several times to ignite a fuse leading to his shoes, the linings of which had been filled with a combination of explosives. If Reid, who was operating on direct orders from Al- Qa’ida, had been able to light the fuse the explosion could very well have opened a gaping hole in the aircraft and resulted in the deaths of hundreds of passengers. You should be aware that the explosive charge that brought down PanAm 103 was the size of a bath-sized bar of soap, but was placed so that it destroyed the hydraulics in the aircraft.
The saga of the so-called Lackawanna 6 actually began months before 9-11. That spring, the six young men of Yemeni heritage - all US-born citizens -- traveled to Afghanistan for training in the infamous al-Farouq Camp, the alma mater for hundreds of Jihadis in training. Yemeni, it is worth noting, is the actual heritage of Usama Bin-Laden, not Saudi as many have come to believe (that is his former nationality as opposed to his heritage). The six men -- Mukhtar Al-Bakri, Sahim Alwan, Faysal Galab, Shafal Mosed, Yaseinn Taher, and Yahya Goba - took different paths after “graduating” from the Al-Farouq Camp. Alarm bells sounded loudly in the CT Community when, in the late summer of 2002, al-Bakri was noted to have used the terms “Wedding” and “Big Meal” when communicating with associates, the use of both of which has preceded and signalled terrorist attacks in the past. While al-Bakri was arrested in Bahrain, other members were taken into custody in the Lackawanna suburb of Buffalo, New York. From al-Bakri’s house, investigators recovered a rifle, and a telescopic sight, along with a cassette tape in which the voice on the tape "implores Allah to give Jews and their enablers (likely the US) a black day." All six were tried, convicted and sentenced to a range of terms in prison, from eight and a half to ten years. Other members of the cell were Ahmed Hijazi and Jaber Elbaneh. Elbanah finally turned himself in to Yemeni Authorities last year, on condition that his sentence would not be extended. Hijazi was incinerated in a car with five others by a Hellfire missile in Yemen in November, 2002.
To the south, in the Virginia suburbs of Washington, DC, a cancer researcher and Islamic scholar named Ali Al-Tamimi convinced several of his young devotees to seek training at Lashkar-e-Taiba training camps in Pakistan in order to engage in violent Jihad against American troops. As we wrote in the third article in this series, the al-Tamimi case is more popularly referred to as the “The Paintball Case” because several of the defendants played paintball in Virginia for training purposes between 2001 and 2004, prior to the trips to Pakistan. At least one of the defendants, Masoud Khan, remained committed to engaging in violence in the name of Islam, and his proposed target of attack possibly shifted from US troops stationed abroad to targets in the US. In May 2003, in Gaithersburg, Maryland, Khan was found in possession of an AK-47-style rifle, a terrorism manual that contained instructions on how to manufacture explosives and how to use chemicals as weapons. He was also in possession of a statement from Usama bin Laden, which read, in part:
So here is America, Allah has struck it in one of its vital points, so
He destroyed her greatest of buildings. And unto Allah is all praise
and He has favored us with this blessing.
And here is America filled with terror from its north and to its south, from its east to its west. And unto
Allah is all praise and He has favored us with this blessing.
Brooklyn-born Jose Padilla (AKA Abdullah al-Muhajir - “The Traveller”) was arrested in Chicago in May, 2002, upon his return from his travels to Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. His ties to Al-Qa’ida were confirmed and he was initially held as a material witness for the case stemming from 9-11, but was later detained as an enemy combatant. It was suspected at the time that Padilla planned to detonate a so-called “dirty bomb” (conventional explosives combined with some sort of radioactive material) in the US. Following a series of legal actions and appeals, Padilla was found guilty of charges of conspiracy to commit murder and of funding and supporting terrorism abroad, and is serving a seventeen-year sentence in federal prison.
July 4, 2002, Hesham Mohamed Hadayet, an Egyptian national who lived in Los Angeles, opened fire on the El Al ticket counter in Los Angeles International Airport, killing two and wounding four others. Hadayet was shot dead by one of the airport security personnel. Although investigators did not find a link between Hadayet and a terrorist group they did find that he had a history of strong anti-Israeli sentiments, and that his objective in the shooting was to influence foreign policy and to die as a martyr.
Ten people in the Metropolitan Washington, DC, area were killed and three others were critically injured in the fall of 2002 when two individuals carried out a series of sniper attacks. The two, John Allen Muhammad and his teenaged protégé, Lee Boyd Malvo, were captured and convicted of those murders as well as their preceding, “rehearsal” killings in Louisiana, Alabama, and Georgia. John Muhammad, named John Allen until he joined the Nation of Islam, found Lee Malvo in a homeless shelter and informally adopted him, subsequently training Malvo to shoot sniper style.
William Krar and his common-law wife were caught stockpiling explosives and chemicals, including two pounds pure sodium cyanide, in April 2003. The exact target of the attack was never publicly disclosed, but Krar’s sympathy for the white supremacist movement was reported in the media. Numerous crimes committed by white supremacist sympathizers are underreported, or go entirely unreported.
Iyman Faris, a naturalized US citizen who arrived in the US from his native Kashmir in 1994, was convicted in 2003 of conspiracy and of providing material support to Al-Qa’ida. Circa 2000-2001, Faris traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan, reportedly meeting personally with Usama Bin Laden and performing logistical tasks for Al-Qa’ida. Faris admitted having researched drawings of the Brooklyn Bridge on the internet and to having inquired as to the source of “welding” torches, in support of a plot to bring down the bridge. After conducting surveillance, Faris reported back to his Al-Qa’ida handlers that the “weather was too hot” to carry out the plot successfully, meaning he felt that there was far too much security presence in New York City. Faris is serving a 20-year sentence imposed by a federal court.
Another chapter in Al-Qa’ida’s efforts was closed in 2004 with the arrest of Dhiren Barot (AKA Abu Issa al-Hindi). Following a sojourn to Pakistan in 1995, Barot joined in the guerrilla campaign against Indian forces in the disputed Kashmir region. He wrote a book on the military experience entitled The Army of Medinah in Kashmir. A few years later, al-Hindi authored a 39-page memo suggesting the use of “simple” explosives made from materials available at local pharmacies and hardware stores. The memo apparently was of use to Al-Qa’ida at-large, having been found on a laptop computer in Pakistan in 2004. All of this is by way of establishing al-Hindi’s credentials because, of greater interest to you is the fact that in the Year 2000, al-Hindi and at least one other associate were in the New York/New Jersey area surveilling financial facilities (The Prudential building; The International Monetary Fund (IMF); The World Bank; The New York Stock Exchange; Citigroup). His intent, he admitted, was to attack the facilities using limousines packed with explosives and radioactive "dirty" bombs.
Also in New York City, Shahawar Matin Siraj and James Elshafay were arrested in August, 2004, for conspiring to detonate a device in New York’s Herald Square subway station. Elshafay, who had entered a guilty plea and testified against Siraj, was sentenced to five years. Siraj received a 30-year sentence.
Four members of a group reportedly called Jamiyyat Ul-Islam (Islamic Group) were arrested in California in August of 2005. Kevin James, Levar Washington, Gregory Patterson, and Hammad Samana were charged with conspiring to attack Los Angeles National Guard facilities, synagogues and other locations in the Orange County, California, area. James, the alleged leader, and the others reportedly planned to get the funds for their attacks through yet other attacks - on gas stations. The four were convicted in December, 2007.
The 2006 convictions of Father/Son - Umer and Hamid Hayat - in California brought to an end an investigation begun earlier. Hamid Hayat, then 22 years old, of Lodi, California, was arrested in 2005 on a series of charges related to his attendance of an Al-Qa’ida training camp and his intention to wage violent Jihad in the United States. Hamid was sentenced on 9-10-2007 to 24 years in prison. Hamid’s father, Umer, later pled guilty to lying to investigators about the amount of money he was taking with him to Pakistan in 2003.
Michael C. Reynolds was arrested in December 2005 and sentenced in November 2007 to 30 years in prison for intending to conspire with Al-Qa’ida to blow up US-based oil refineries in exchange for $40,000. Reynolds, who was discovered in an online Jihadi chat forum attempting to broker a deal with members of Al-Qa’ida, claimed to be merely trying to uncover and entrap others who might carry out such an attack. Although Reynolds’ true ideological intention was unclear and his mental status questionable, his case is not unique. (See Singleton DOJ release). There have been other Americans who support violent Jihad and who attempt to participate via the internet. This may appear to be a relatively harmless pursuit, but if the right connections are made, an individual who is already indoctrinated -- and perhaps mentally unstable -- could be guided to assist in or to execute a lethal attack.
Ultimately, five individuals were arrested and indicted in 2006-2007, in Ohio and Illinois, for conspiracy to seek recruits willing to commit terrorist acts abroad (Iraq), searching for sites to train others in combat skills - including the use of explosives - agreeing to raise funds and to obtain information on IEDs. Khaleel Ahmed, his cousin Zubair Ahmed, Zand Mazloum, Marwan El-Hindi, and Mohammad Amawi pled not guilty at the time. The investigation into this plot was carried out with the assistance of an informant who was asked to train the group.
On 3 March 2006, after intentionally striking nine students with his rented Jeep at an estimated speed of 40-45 miles per hour at the University of North Carolina, Mohammed Taheri-azar - an Iranian born US citizen -- dialed 9-1-1 and turned himself in to authorities. Taheri-azar stated he wanted to “follow in the footsteps of one of my role models, Mohammad Atta, one of the 9-11 hijackers.” While some wondered if Taheri-azar’s attack was terrorism-related, he is reported to have told investigators that he wanted to "avenge the deaths or murders of Muslims around the world." Taheri-azar pled guilty to nine counts of attempted first-degree murder on August 13, 2008.
Two men from the Atlanta, Georgia, area - Ehsanul Sadequee and Syed Ahmed, were accused in April, 2006, of having conspired with members of the “Toronto 17” to receive training with the intention in mind of waging an attack, and of gathering video-surveillance of potential targets in the Washington, DC, area. The two were indicted for surveilling locations such as the US Capitol building and the headquarters of The World Bank. Both pled not guilty.
Seven members of the group “Seas of David” were arrested in June, 2006, charged with conspiracy to attack the Sears Tower in Chicago. The group’s leader, Narseal Batiste, as well as Patrick Abraham, Stanley Phanor, Naudimar Herrera, Burson Augustin, Lygnelson Lemorin, and Rotschild Augustin pled not guilty. While authorities acknowledged that the group did not possess weapons at the time, allegations against the seven included attempting to contact Al-Qa’ida, stating that Batiste was organizing an Islamic Army to wage Jihad inside the US, requesting uniforms for the group as well as automatic weapons, radios, vehicles, and bullet-proof vests.
A plot to bomb New York City tunnels carrying train traffic was uncovered in 2006 during FBI surveillance of internet chat rooms. A total of eight suspects were charged, including, ominously, Assem Hammoud, an Al-Qa’ida affiliate located in Lebanon. Hammoud, who admitted to complicity in the plot, was taken into custody in Lebanon. The plot involved the use of backpack-borne explosive devices similar to those used in the 7 and 21 July, 2005 London attacks.
Naveed Afzal Haq, an American of Pakistani descent, went on a rampage at the Jewish Federation of Greater Seattle on 28 July, 2006, after forcing his entry by holding a gun to the head of a 13-year-old girl. Haq then opened fire with two semiautomatic pistols, killing Pamela Waechter and wounding five more women in the Federation’s office spaces. Haq told police hostage negotiators, “I’m upset at your foreign policy. These are Jews and I am tired of getting pushed around and our people getting pushed around by the situation in the Middle East.” Jurors in the case were unable to reach a verdict in June of 2008. A retrial will occur, probably in March of 2009.
The Trolley Square Mall in Salt Lake City, Utah, was the scene of an attack on 12 February, 2007, when Sulejman Talovic killed five people and wounded five others. Although the shooter was killed and no motive was established, Talovic, a high school dropout who reportedly was rarely seen by his neighbors, may have been influenced by the previous Serbian executions of Bosnian Muslims, including possibly his own relatives. One source reported that the phrase “Allahu Akbar” could be heard twice on the raw footage of the attack provided by a TV station.
A group comprising immigrants from the former Yugoslavia, Turkey, and a US citizen was charged last year with conspiracy to attack and kill soldiers on Fort Dix in New Jersey; other nearby military facilities had also apparently been scouted. Five of the six arrested in May, 2007, were alleged to have gone on training expeditions near Gouldsboro in Pennsylvania’s Pocono Mountains; the remaining group member was charged with helping to obtain weapons. The plot came to light when a store clerk became suspicious because the materials the group had asked him to put onto a DVD included footage of them firing weapons and calling for “Jihad.”
Four conspirators, who were motivated by their desire to retaliate against the US for its support of Israel, planned to blow up fuel tanks and a pipeline carrying jet fuel at New York’s JFK Airport in 2007. The fuel storage tanks and the pipeline are located in some of the most densely populated areas in the US. The conspirators were natives of Trinidad and Guyana.
Undoubtedly, you will read of additional plots that were discovered and interrupted or stopped. Unfortunately, you will also see media coverage of attacks that have taken place, despite the best efforts of those who watch out for you. Most, though, will be on the scale of the lone actor who goes on a rampage at an airport or a shopping mall, or who plants an IED somewhere. We have already seen several examples like this, including Naveed Haq in Seattle and Mohammed Taheri-azar in North Carolina. While those kinds of attacks are not on the scale of 9-11, that will be scant comfort to the families of those wounded and killed.
You have just finished reading a list of plots and incidents. Whether that number was less than, equal to, or more than the number you would have estimated, perhaps you are able to think of other examples that were not included here. We hope that this presentation has caused you to reevaluate the notion that we have not been attacked since 9-11, and to consider our cause for concern that another terrorist attack on the homeland is highly likely. We will now turn our eyes (and your eyes, we hope) forward by giving you a more detailed look at the threat from each of the types of groups.
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If Musharraf Goes: Assessments and Opportunities
By Aaron Mannes
There are reports that Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf will be stepping down in the next few days in order to avoid impeachment. Musharraf has denied these reports, but the prominence of the rumors indicates strongly that the political balance of power has shifting against Musharraf - he will almost certainly be reduced to a figurehead. It is difficult to say how history will judge Musharraf. From the American perspective he was not adequately taking on Islamic extremism. But from the Pakistani perspective he was becoming an American lackey. The truth is somewhere in between. What Musharraf lacked was either the desire or the capability to take on the systemic problems bedeviling Pakistan. It is possible that with his exit from the scene, a new opportunity to take on these challenges could emerge.
On one level, Musharraf has been cooperative on counter-terror issues, arresting high-profile al-Qaeda and acquiescing to missile strikes on Pakistani territory. However, while missile strikes are a useful tool - they are no substitute for a serious policy. They have also contributed to Musharraf’s loss of standing in Pakistan, since he is seen as subordinating Pakistani sovereignty - and lives (these strikes have, unfortunately, killed civilians) - to American priorities.
On the other hand, Pakistan has not successfully taken control of the tribal areas where al-Qaeda is re-grouping. Americans would be wise to temper their criticism of the Pakistani military’s counter-insurgency efforts.
Read the complete post here.
Quilliam Responds
By Michael Jacobson
In July, Maajid Nawaz, the co-director of the London-based Quilliam Foundation, was in Washington, testifying before the Senate Homeland Security Committee, and speaking at a number of DC think tanks, including the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Mr. Nawaz and his colleague Ed Husain -- the author of the fascinating book The Islamist -- formed Quilliam as a "a counter extremism think tank” and are now actively attempting to take on the ideology they previously espoused. A summary of Mr. Nawaz's speech at the Washington Institute is available here.
In a July 16 posting, Jeffrey Imm took issue with some of Quilliam's stances, including their support for the grand mufti of Egypt.
Mr. Nawaz has written a response to this post and to other criticisms which have been directed at Quilliam. I am posting it on Quilliam's behalf.
"The Right and Wrong Voices," Response by Maajid Nawaz, Co-Director of the Quilliam Foundation
Since being invited to Washington in July 2008, the Quilliam Foundation has received an overwhelming response from supportive voices across the political spectrum. As a result of this work, both Ed Husain and I have been invited to return this September. Our forthcoming trip coincides with Ed Husain’s American launch of his book The Islamist, published by Penguin.
Naturally, and after observing the level of publicity our foundation has enjoyed, some voices have asked more detailed questions about our policies. I have been asked to outline our view on a number of issues ranging from our praise of the Mufti of Egypt, Ali Goma; our stance on a British religious leader Dr. Usama Hassan; our stance on Shari’ah “law” and our selection of Quilliam as a name.
The Quilliam Foundation has no formal links with Mufti Ali Goma of Egypt. However, we have named him on our website as a scholastic giant. Some have asked us whether we know of Mufti Ali Goma’s stance on suicide bombings. Firstly, let me clarify that our view on suicide bombings is on the record. We have explicitly condemned the deliberate targeting of non-combatants, in Israel or anywhere else in the world. Ed Husain directly criticised Qardawi’s fatwa justifying suicide bombings whilst in Qatar for the Doha Debates. Furthermore, I personally challenged Azzam Tamimi - Hamas representative in the UK - on this matter in a studio debate on BBC’s flagship Newsnight with Jeremy Paxman (video).
It follows, therefore, that we would naturally be concerned if figures we have named as ‘scholastic giants’ were to be discovered as supporting such actions. On July 30th 2008 a letter was sent to Secretary of State Condaleezza Rice by two prominent and respected Senators, Tom Coburn and Jon Kyl. In this letter, the Senators referred to a 2003 article in Egypt’s “Al-Haqiqa” newspaper quoting Ali Goma defending terrorist acts in Israel. The respected Senators have cited Rabinowitz, Beila and William Mayer from their paper entitled “State Department Funding ISNA’s Propagation of Islam via citizen exchange program” (Pipe Line News, 25 April 2008) as a reference for this allegation against Ali Goma.
Since these questions were raised I did my own research. I have found this source referred to by Rabinowitz, Beila and William Mayer. It is a secondary source that does not quote Ali Goma directly. Rather surprisingly, it is also a Wahabite-Islamist source, being a newspaper that explicitly promotes a Shari’ah-law based Caliphate and attacks Shi’ah Muslims as heretics. I felt, therefore, that it would be helpful for people to know who they are being asked to rely on for evidence. The following extract is taken from an article stating that by far the biggest ‘danger to Islam’ in Egypt is the modernising agenda of Mufti Ali Goma, due to his articulate, learned and popular approach to reform issues:
ليس كسابقه الذي كان دينه هو دين الحكومة إذا أحلت أحل وإن حرمت حرم !! فهو يحاول أن يكتسب مصداقية بمخالفة الرأي الرسمي للحكومة والدولة مثل رأيه في العمليات الاستشهادية مثلاً واعتبار من يقول بحرمتها أنه حمار ـ أعزكم الله ـ وذلك بعد تصريح شيخ الأزهر بأنها انتحار محرم بأقل من أسبوع, في تحدي واضح لرأس المؤسسة الدينية في مصر
He (Ali Goma) is not like his predecessor, whose religion was simply the religion of the government of the day. If such a government made something permissible (Halal), he too would |
